By J. Sri Raman
t r u t h o u t |
Perspective
Friday 13 October 2006
The most immediate questions raised by North Korea's nuclear-weapon test were not about its impact on Northeast Asia. They concerned the consequences of the test for two far-off countries of the continent - Iran and India.
The world waits, with trepidation, to see what the blast means for Tehran and the bleeding Middle East. What deserves to be watched with nearly equal concern is how the "provocation" from Pyongyang (as Washington describes it) impacts the US-India nuclear "deal."
Indications as of now are that the nuclear test won't act as a deterrent against the "deal." Not only that. Chances are that the US-India "strategic partnership," which the "deal" is supposed to symbolize, is now poised to be carried to the stage of a closer and more dangerous collaboration.
The first reactions to the test in the pro-"deal" quarters in India betrayed a new fear following a major frustration. New Delhi's reverie, in which it saw the elite nuclear club receiving it soon at least as a second-class member, suffered a rude jolt in the US Senate at the end of September. The House went into a recess then without passing a bill to arm President George Bush with powers to implement the "deal." Nuclear hawks, wearing the hat of "experts," hastened to restore the morale of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government. They held out the hope that Indian and US mandarins together will find a constitutional way out of the impasse by mid-November.
Then came the North Korea's nuclear revolt, and the hope seemed to recede. Reports from Washington recorded the fears of the pro-"deal" lobbyists (with corporate interests in the lead) that Kim Jong-Il had thrown a lifeline to their opponents in the Senate. The Bush regime - so it was argued - could not convincingly act outraged over North Korea's violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) while rewarding a non-signatory to the treaty with nuclear largesse.
Such simple and straight logic, however, did not apply to a "strategic partnership." The "experts" swung into action again, counseling the government and reassuring the country against despair over the "deal." In their view, a prompt and correct response to the test could save the "deal" and actually strengthen the "partnership." New Delhi acted on the advice, and has had no reason for regret.
As we have noted in these columns before, New Delhi has long been rehearsing for the role of a recognized member of the "nuclear club" by lecturing non-nuclear-weapon nations on non-proliferation. Even while pursuing the "deal," it has been reminding Iran and North Korea of their "duties" under the NPT, which India has rejected as "discriminatory" down the decades. The harangue has acquired a holier tone since the North Korean test.
Besides denouncing the test as a "violation of [North Korea's] international commitments," India's Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee talked of Pyongyang's illustration of "the dangers of clandestine proliferation." The layman may wonder if a nuclear bomb becomes any more or less of a weapon of mass destruction because of the manner of its acquisition. The Indian "expert" and establishment, however, are trying to make an entirely different point.
The reference to "clandestine proliferation" is a none-too-veiled allusion to reports of covert nuclear collaboration between North Korea and Pakistan, with the suspected involvement of infamous Abdul Qadeer Khan. Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf has reacted by making a distinction between his country and Khan as an individual scientist of adventurous inclinations. The general has also denied any link between the Pakistan and North Korean nuclear programs.
New Delhi, however, has not been deterred from its campaign with the dual aim of pleasing Bush and baiting Pakistan. The articulate "experts" are admonishing innocent Indians who might have taken the India-Pakistan "peace process" too seriously. They are asking the people to remember that Pakistan's missiles, developed with North Korean help, can hit all major Indian cities. That India's missiles can bomb out Pakistan's cities, too, seems to the "experts" somewhat beside the point.
The "experts" have proven right in their expectations from Washington. US Under Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Nicholas Burns has just ruled out any comparison between the Bush-aided blooming of India as a nuclear power and the reprehensibly "clandestine proliferation" represented by a "rogue state" like North Korea. Burns has assured New Delhi that the Bush administration will continue to "push" the "deal." That should have sufficed for the purposes of the "strategic partnership."
The "experts," however, are of the view that, with the test, the time has come to enlarge the scope of the US-India team-up. They are calling on New Delhi to take two concrete and major steps toward making the "strategic partnership" appear almost a military alliance. They want India to enlist as a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and to get inducted into the US Missile Defense program. India's political establishment has not been opposed to either of the proposals in principle.
In the wake of 9/11, India's navy joined the US in the euphemistically so-described "search" and "anti-piracy" operations in the Straits of Malacca and did not endear itself to the Southeast Asian countries and governments in the process. This was the beginning of the Bush campaign for a PSI.
Strategic analyst and member of India's National Security Advisory Board C. Raja Mohan now writes: "It is fine to raise the alarm bells on illicit nuclear trade (as India has done after North Korea's test). But what is India doing about it?... Why is New Delhi not part of the current global mechanism (the PSI) designed precisely to counter clandestine proliferation?"
In 2001, India was among the first few states to extend support to the National Missile Defense and Theater Missile Defense programs of the USA. In return then for India's support for the programs (on the specious ground of the "deep cuts" these would effect in the US nuclear arsenal), Washington had certified that India had developed only a "minimum nuclear deterrent."
On June 27, 2005, in Washington, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and India's Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed a ten-year agreement titled the New Framework for US-India Defense Relationship (NFDR). The agreement had a provision for India's induction into the missile defense program. Raja Mohan argues that this is an ideal time to tap the potential of the provision.
Says he: "One inevitable consequence of North Korea's nuclear weapons will be the acceleration of the missile defense programs of the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan. Must India be the last Asian power to focus on missile defense?"
The North Korean nuclear test will not only threaten peace and security in Northeast Asia. The post-test tremors will be felt in South Asia as well.
A freelance journalist and a peace activist of India, J. Sri Raman is the author of Flashpoint (Common Courage Press, USA). He is a regular contributor to t r u t h o u t.
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